The regulation of the duration of bail as determined in the Criminal Procedure Act in accordance with which bail, as a substitute and milder measure than detention may last longer than detention, is not inconsistent with the Constitution. For the entire time of the duration of bail the conditions which require such must be fulfilled and the court must observe such ex officio. The court must in every individual instance take into consideration that the final deadline until which bail may last is the final conclusion of the criminal proceedings or in certain cases the beginning of the implementation of the punishment imposed. The defendant's right to criminal proceedings against him or her being concluded in a reasonable time already follows from the first paragraph of Article 23 of the Constitution. Furthermore, from the principle of proportionality there also follows the requirement that in cases in which a restrictive measure which entails an interference with the defendant's human rights or fundamental freedoms is imposed against the defendant, a reasonable time for the duration of the proceedings must be reviewed by applying stricter criteria. The criteria which have developed in constitutional case law for a review of the duration of detention, must be taken into consideration fundamentally also when reviewing the duration of bail. The court must, when reviewing the reasonable duration of the proceedings, consider the promptness of the proceedings of all bodies which participated in criminal proceedings as regards the nature and characteristics of the individual criminal proceedings, and the defendant's conduct in proceedings. If criminal proceedings last longer, the proportionality of the interference with the right determined in Article 33 of the Constitution must be reviewed from such point of view and in cases in which such interference can no longer be justified from the viewpoint of the duration, bail must be lifted before the time determined in the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 198 of the Criminal Procedure Act. It can be concluded that it is justified that proceedings last longer only on the basis of the substantiated justification that the case is demanding from the viewpoint of the facts and law. The review of the admissibility of the interference from the viewpoint of its duration also requires an evaluation whether the proceedings are conducted continuously or with delays that can be attributed to the conduct of the bodies that participated in the criminal proceedings. The court could evaluate whether the measure was still admissible regardless of the established duration only on the basis of facts established in such a manner and also considering the circumstances that it stated in its reasoning. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned, the court's arguments that it reviewed the admissibility of bail also from the viewpoint of its duration do not justify the conclusion that the measure is still proportionate regardless of the established duration. Therefore, the court of first instance violated the complainants' right to property determined in Article 33 of the Constitution. The Higher Court did not remedy such violation, therefore it also violated Article 33 of the Constitution.