A defendant may renounce the right to examine incriminating witnesses assuming that he or she has been informed of the fact that such procedural act, i.e. the examination of incriminating witnesses, will be performed; however, a court may not deprive a defendant of such right by its conduct. The conduct of the court, namely that it first informed the defence of the fact that incriminating witnesses will be examined, and subsequently deprived the defence of the possibility to examine such witnesses, as it did not inform the defence of the changed date of the examination hearing, in fact entails a deprivation or hollowing out of the right to examine incriminating witnesses and consequently of the right to a defence. The standpoint of the Higher Court according to which the court of first instance did not have a duty to summon the complainant and his defence council or inform them of individual procedural acts, also entails a violation of this right. The standpoint of the Higher Court that the complainant entirely exercised his right to be heard in minor offence proceedings already by a written defence in fact denies the complainant the right to any further activities in the proceedings, thus also to examine the incriminating witnesses he called and thereby inadmissibly interferes with his right to a defence determined in Article 29 of the Constitution.